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Using conservation laws, we provide a new proof of the Hartwick result, i.e. there is inter-
generational equity if and only if net investment is constant. Subsequently, the technique
is used to show that constant net investment does not indicate intergenerational equity if
consumers value the existence of an essential non-renewable resource.
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1 Introduction
A fundamental question in resource economics is whether, in the presence of exhaustible
resources, it is possible to achieve intergenerational equity. Hartwick (1977) shows that
in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model (Dasgupta & Heal, 1974; Solow, 1974) this is possible
along competitive paths provided that net investment in man-made capital and natural
resources is zero. When the depletion of natural resources is balanced by investment in
man-made capital, this will lead to sustainable levels of consumption. The rule of zero net
investment is referred to as the Hartwick rule and the Hartwick result is that following the
Hartwick rule leads to intergenerational equity.
Dixit, Hammond, and Hoel (1980) extend the Hartwick result in two directions. First,
the Hartwick result holds in a wide variety of economic models. We refer to the general ver-
sion of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model as the Dixit-Hammond-Hoel model (DHH model).
Second, they show that constant net investment (i.e. the generalized Hartwick rule) is nec-
essary and sucient for intergenerational equity. Asheim, Buchholz, and Withagen (2003)
give an overview of the literature and discuss the subtleties of the Hartwick rule.
The competitive equilibrium of Hartwick (1977) and Dixit et al. (1980) is equivalent to
the optimal allocation by a social planner with a zero discount rate. A distinctive feature
CeNDEF, Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11,
1018WB, Amsterdam, e-mail: p.heijnen@uva.nl. Financial support by the Netherlands Organization for
Scientic Research (NWO) is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Florian Wagener and Bert Schoonbeek for
helpful comments.
1of these kind of optimal control problems is that the Hamilton function is a preserved
quantity. Sato and Kim (2002) show that in the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow model the generalized
Hartwick rule can be derived from a conservation law. In this paper, we show that this can
also be done in the more general DHH model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews concepts. In Section 3 the DHH
model is introduced and we give a new proof of the Hartwick result. Subsequently, in
Section 4, the technique is used to treat an extension of the DHH model. We show that
following the Hartwick rule leads to decreasing welfare if consumers value the existence of
an essential non-renewable resource. Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminary remarks





u(c;k)dt subject to _ k = f(c;k);
where k(0) = k0 is given, T > 0; c(t) 2 Rn the control variable and k(t) 2 Rm is the state
variable. Note the absence of discounting. Let q 2 Rm denote the costate variable. The
Pontryagin function is given by1
P(c;k;q) = u(c;k) + q
0f(c;k)
and the Hamilton function by
H(k;q) = max
c P(c;k;q):




and _ qi =  
@H
@ki
for i = 1;:::;m.
This is called a Hamiltonian system. A fundamental property of a Hamiltonian system is
that the Hamilton function H is a rst integral of this system, i.e. H is constant along

























The system has a conservation law where H is the preserved quantity. For a textbook
treatment of Hamiltonian systems see e.g. Hirsch, Smale, and Devaney (2004, pp.207{210).
1We assume that the optimal control problem is nicely behaved, i.e the maximum exists and the
Hamilton function is dierentiable. Moreover all vectors are column vectors and a transpose is indicated
by a 0.
2Hamiltonian systems are most commonly used in physics. In this context H is the
total energy of a closed system. Conservation laws are a manifestation of the symmetry of
nature. Noether's theorem states (roughly) that every symmetry leads to a conservation
law. For example, the invariance with respect to time reversal gives the law of conservation
of energy. It is this symmetry that a positive discount rate breaks.
3 The DHH model and the Hartwick result
We follow Asheim et al. (2003) in the presentation of the DHH model. Let t  0 denote
time. Consumption 
ows at time t are denoted by a vector c(t). Capital stocks at time t
are denoted by k(t) and investment 
ows by _ k(t). Capital stocks consist of both man-made
capital and natural resources. The initial stock of capital k(0) is denoted by k0. Technol-
ogy is described by a time-independent set F. The triple (c(t);k(t); _ k(t)) is attainable if
(c(t);k(t); _ k(t)) 2 F. A path fc(t);k(t); _ k(t)gT
0 is feasible given k0 if k(0) = k0 and for
all t 2 [0;T] (c(t);k(t); _ k(t)) is attainable. The time index is mostly suppressed to avoid
cluttered notation. We put the following standard assumptions on F:
{ F is smooth, closed and convex,
{ Non-negative consumption: (c;k; _ k) 2 F implies c  0,
{ Non-negative capital stocks: (c;k; _ k) 2 F implies k  0,
{ Free disposal of investment: (c;k; _ k) 2 F and _ `  _ k implies (c;k; _ `) 2 F.
Denition (Investment function). Dene f(c;k) := maxfsj(c;k;s) 2 Fg as the maximum
amount of investment that is technologically feasible.
Remark. Prot maximization and non-negative prices imply that actual investment choices
will be on the boundary of F and given by f(c;k). Given the assumptions on F, this will
be a dierentiable function.
We assume that population size is constant. Each generation lives for one instance and
each generation has the same preferences about the 
ow of consumption. These preferences
are captured by a utility function u(c), which is increasing and strictly concave. Let p(t)  0
denote the vector of prices of the consumption 
ow and let q(t)  0 denote the vector of
prices of the investment 
ow. Then prot is given by the sum of revenue, the change in
the value of the capital stock and net investment :
 = p
0c + q
0_ k + _ q
0k:
Note that the generalized Hartwick rule is that net investment q0_ k is constant.
Denition (Competitive). Let T > 0. A path fc(t);k(t); _ k(t)gT
0 is competitive during
[0;T] if the path is feasible and both instantaneous utility and prot are maximized along
the path given p(t) and q(t).
3Remark. Note that T is allowed to be innitely large. Like the rest of the literature, the
question, whether a competitive path exists, is left open. But this question is especially
pressing if T = +1.
Theorem (The generalized Hartwick result). Suppose a path fc(t);k(t); _ k(t)gT
0 is compet-
itive during [0;T]. Then u(c) is constant over time if and only if q0_ k is constant.
Remark. Hartwick (1977) only showed that q0_ k = 0 implies that u(c) is constant over time.
The generalized Hartwick result is due to Dixit et al. (1980).
The original proof in Dixit et al. (1980) uses the rst order conditions that result
from the instantaneous utility and prot maximizing. We show that competitive paths are
solutions of the canonical equations of an optimal control problem. Moreover, the canonical
equations for this optimal control problem form a Hamiltonian system. The result then
follows directly from the Hamilton function being a preserved quantity.
Proof. First we have to establish equivalence between the competitive path and solutions
of the canonical equations of an optimal control problem. Firms maximize instantaneous
prot  given prices p(t) and q(t) and the technological constraint _ k = f(c;k). This yields
the following two rst order conditions:
p + (Dfc)q = 0; (1)
and
_ q =  (Dfk)q; (2)
where Dfc is the Jacobian of f w.r.t. c and Dfk is the Jacobian of f w.r.t. k. Equation (2)
is Hotelling's rule, which guarantees local eciency. Instantaneous utility maximization
means maximization of u(c)   p0c yielding the rst-order condition rcu = p, where rc
denotes the gradient w.r.t c. Substituting this into (1) yields:
rcu + (Dfc)q = 0: (3)
The evolution of capital stock is given by:
_ k = f(c;k): (4)
We now claim that properties of an competitive path can be found by examining the





u(c)dt such that (c;k; _ k) 2 F and k(0) = k0:
The Pontryagin function is
P(c;k;q) = u(c) + q
0f(c;k);
4where q the costate. The rst-order conditions for the optimal control are given by (3).
The Hamiltonian of this system is
H(k;q) = max




where c = argmaxc u(c) + q0f(c;k). The canonical equations are then
_ q =  
@H
@k




Straightforward calculations show that these are resp. equal to (2) and (4).
Now we can exploit the fact that we have a Hamiltonian system. The value of H is
preserved as shown in Section 2. Hence if u(c) is constant over time, then q0_ k = H u(c)
is also constant. And similarly if q0_ k is constant over time, then u(c) = H   q0_ k is also
constant.
This approach is useful for a number of reasons. Foremost, it is a natural approach that
allows for properties of the equilibrium to be derived directly from the Hamilton function.
Moreover the Hamilton function is easy to interpret: the approach reveals clearly the direct
tradeo between consumption now and additional investment in capital. Additionally with
our approach extending the Hartwick result to other models becomes a straightforward
exercise.
4 Application to an extension of the DHH model
In this section, an extension of the DHH model will be discussed. In doing so, we will see
that extending the Hartwick result to other models is straightforward using the method
proposed in this paper.
For instance, Heal (1998, pp.7{10) criticizes the DHH model | and implicitly the
Hartwick rule as a criterion for sustainability | for only valuing natural resources as
inputs to production and not as assets in their own right. If we include capital in the
utility function, then the Hamilton function becomes maxc u(c;k) + q0f(c;k) and we still
have that u(c;k) is constant over time if and only if q0_ k is constant.2
However it is no longer sustained by a competitive equilibrium since capital is now an
externality. Because the costate is no longer equal to the market price of capital, constant
net investment (at market prices) does not imply intergenerational equity. In fact welfare
is decreasing over time.
To see this, suppose the (generalized) Hartwick rule holds at market prices and con-
sumers value the existence of certain essential non-renewable resources. Since consumers
value the existence of resources, we have rku  0. The inequality is strict only for the
2This result is also obtained by d'Autume and Schubert (2008) in the context of the Dasgupta-Heal-
Solow model. We look at the more general DHH model. Moreover d'Autume and Schubert do not compare
the optimal solution to a competitive equilibrium.
5resources whose existence is valued. If the capital stock with index i is essential and non-
renewable, then _ ki < 0. At least one of the non-renewable resources is both essential for
production and valued by consumers. Hence (rku)0_ k < 0.
Next we have to specify a measure of welfare. The Hamilton function is the Hick-
sian measure of welfare. Hicksian welfare is an explicitly dynamic measure and is loosely
dened as the maximal amount of consumption that will not harm future consumption.
Its measurable equivalent is net national product (Weitzman, 1976; Asheim & Weitzman,
2001).












where the rst term is negative by assumption and the second term is zero because the
(generalized) Hartwick rule holds at market prices. (The Appendix contains an alternative
derivation.)
This establishes the following theorem which underpins Heal's criticism:
Theorem (The Hartwick rule with existence value). If consumers value the existence of
an essential non-renewable resource and the (generalized) Hartwick rule holds at market
prices, then welfare is strictly decreasing over time.
5 Concluding remarks
In any optimal control problem with a zero discount rate, the value of the Hamilton function
is preserved. In economics, these kind of problems are rarely considered, mostly because
humans prefer the present over the future. However, the fair use of nite natural resources
should imply equal treatment across generations.
In this paper we have shown that, in this context, properties of competitive paths can
be derived directly from the Hamilton function. This leads to the (generalized) Hartwick
rule, where constant net investment is necessary and sucient for intergenerational equity.
As an application of this method, we showed that the Hartwick rule fails as a measure of
sustainability if natural resources have existence value.
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Appendix
Recall that the Hamilton function is dened as:
H(k;q) = max
c u(c;k) + q
0_ k:
Note that q is the market price and does not re
ect the true cost of exhausting a resource.
Using the envelope theorem we get:
_ H = (rkH)
0_ k + (rqH)
0 _ q;
= (rku)
0_ k + q
0(Dfk)
0_ k + _ q
0_ k;
= (rku + (Dfk)q + _ q)
0_ k:
As a consequence of prot maximization, we have (Dfk)q + _ q = 0 (cf. eq. 2):
_ H = (rku)
0_ k < 0;
which shows that welfare is decreasing.
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